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inspired the second author for more than fifty years, and who is the founder of
Cp-theory as a coherent subfield of general topology.
Abstract
We survey discrete and continuous model-theoretic notions which have
important connections to general topology. We present a self-contained
exposition of several interactions between continuous logic and Cp-theory
which have applications to a classification problem involving Banach spaces
not including c0 or lp, following recent results obtained by P. Casazza and
J. Iovino for compact continuous logics. Using Cp-theoretic results in-
volving Grothendieck spaces and double limit conditions, we extend their
results to a broader family of logics, namely those with a first countable
weakly Grothendieck space of types. We pose Cp-theoretic problems which
have model-theoretic implications.
1 Introduction
It is perhaps impossible to find an area of modern mathematical research in
which topology does not play a relevant role. This, of course, does not imply that
a particular instance of this fact has to be of interest for topologists in general.
This survey paper is intended to serve as an introduction to model theory,
especially to continuous logics, for those who have had little or no previous
contact with this branch of mathematical logic, showing how several model-
theoretic results can be equivalently translated into topological statements and
how answering Cp-theoretic questions can lead to solving problems in the context
of continuous logics. In particular, we present new results concerning Gowers’
problem [16] about the definability of a pathological Banach space.
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Model theory is mainly concerned with theories and models. Theories are
sets of axioms and their logical consequences, and a model of a theory is a
mathematical structure satisfying the axioms. A model theorist studies the
connections between syntax and semantics: the syntax refers to certain allowable
strings of symbols whereas the semantics are about the interpretations of these
symbols in a structure. Classical model theory is centred around first-order
logic, the logic mathematicians usually work with, in which the Compactness
Theorem holds: if every finite set of formulas of a theory has a model, then
the theory has a model. Given any logic and a language L, two topological
spaces are of interest: the space of L-structures and the space of types. The
Compactness Theorem holds if and only if those spaces are compact.
Let c00 denote the space of eventually zero sequences of real numbers, c0
the space of sequences for which the limit is zero, and lp the space of sequences
(〈xn : n < ω〉) of real numbers such that
∑
n<ω |xn|
p < ∞. The main topic
presented here is a classification problem in continuous logic, which involves a
fair amount of Cp-theory. In 1974, B. Tsirelson [41] constructed a Banach space
which does not include a copy of lp or c0. The construction involves a process
of approximation that had its inspiration in Cohen’s forcing method. What is
now called Tsirelson’s space is due to T. Figiel and W. Johnson [15] and is the
dual of the original space constructed by Tsirelson: let {xn : n < ω} be the
canonical basis for c00. If x =
∑
n<ω anxn ∈ c00 and E,F ∈ [ω]
<ω, denote∑
n∈E anxn by Ex and write E ≤ F if and only if maxE ≤ minF . The norm
‖ ‖T of Tsirelson’s space T is constructed by an approximation process and is
the unique norm satisfying: ‖x‖T = max{‖x‖c00 ,
1
2max{
∑
i<k ‖Eix‖T : {k} ≤
E1 < · · · < Ek}} (see [15] for the details). This equation captures the essence
of what analysts call implicit definability: the norm of Tsirelson’s space ‖ ‖T
appears on both sides of the previous defining equality. Intuitively, to obtain an
implicitly definable Banach space, one has to write down a “definition”, which
may very well mention the object to be defined on both sides of the defining
equality, and then prove existence and uniqueness of the “defined” object, as
opposed to explicitly definable objects which are simply defined by a formula.
For a detailed exposition of Tsirelson’s space, the reader is referred to P. Casazza
and T. Shura [9]. After Tsirelson, many other pathological Banach spaces were
constructed using similar techniques. The motivational problem for our work
was posed by E. Odell and popularized by W. T. Gowers [16]: is it true that
if a Banach space is explicitly definable, then it includes a copy of lp or c0?
Of course, this is a vague question that requires a rigorous formulation. The
first problem one faces is to choose the logic to work with; even for first-order
logic the answer was unknown until [8]. Continuous logics are the natural
candidates for logics as they provide the necessary tools for the analyst’s ε-play
and approximations. P. Casazza and J. Iovino [8] presented both a formulation
and a solution of this problem in the context of compact continuous logics, i.e.
continuous logics which are finitary in nature.
The purpose of addressing parts of the work in [8] here is twofold: to isolate
the most relevant interactions between topology and model theory in their paper,
and to provide the reader with definitions and approaches that may be more
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suitable for extending the contents of [8] to non-compact continuous logics such
as continuous Lω1,ω (defined below). A Cp-theoretic problem involved in this
classification problem concerns establishing conditions for X such that A¯ being
compact, for a subspace A of Cp(X), is equivalent to a double limit condition
holding. The literature on this problem includes A. Grothendieck [17], V. Pta´k
[29], N. Young [42], A. V. Arhangel’ski˘ı [3] and V. V. Tkachuk [37].
Sections 1 and 2 provide a self-contained introduction to classical results in
discrete model theory (discrete refers to classical logic where truth values are
either 0 or 1) that will then be generalized in the context of continuous logics
for metric structures following [5], [6] and [12]. Sections 3 and 4 provide a back-
ground beyond two-valued first-order logic for the subsequent results. Section
5 includes an exposition of the interactions between Cp-theory and continuous
logic in [8] together with a couple of Cp-theoretic questions and problems that
would have implications in continuous model theory. Cp-theorists who find Sec-
tions 3 and 4 heavy-going may want to temporarily skip ahead to the discussion
of Grothendieck spaces in Section 5. Section 6 includes generalizations and some
remarks regarding the same classification problem that is addressed in [8], in
the context of infinitary continuous logic.
2 Preliminaries - What is Model Theory?
We first set out some elementary notions that will be used throughout. For a
more detailed exposition, see [36]. A language is a set of constants, function
symbols and relation symbols, e.g. {∈} is the language of set theory, where ∈
is a binary relation, and {e¯, ∗,−1 } is the language of group theory, where e¯ is a
constant, ∗ is a binary relation and −1 is an unary function. First-order logic
is the usual logic used in mathematics: given a language L formulas are built
recursively as certain finite strings of symbols built using the members of L,
parentheses, variables, and the logical connectives ∧,∨,→,↔,¬ and quantifiers
∃, ∀. For the rest of this section let L be a fixed language. Sometimes it will be
useful to denote a formula ϕ by ϕ1 and ¬ϕ by ϕ0.
An L-structure M is a set M , called the universe of M together with an
interpretation of elements of L, i.e. a function which assigns an element of
M to each constant symbol, a function from Mn to M to each n-ary function
symbol, and a subset of Mn to each n-ary relation symbol. Given an L-formula
ϕ, we denote by ϕM the interpretation of ϕ in M. A substructure N of M is
just an L-structure, the universe of which is N , a subset of M , containing all
the same interpretations of symbols from M. For instance, in the language of
group theory, the formula (∀x)(∃y)(x ∗ y = e¯) is interpreted as (∀x ∈ Z)(∃y ∈
Z)(x + y = 0) in the additive group Z.
A variable is said to be free in a formula if it is not under the scope of any
quantifier; a sentence is a formula without free variables. A theory is a set of sen-
tences and their logical consequences; a theory is consistent if it has a model and
a maximal consistent theory is said to be complete (Note consistency is often de-
fined proof-theoretically: not every sentence can be proved. The Completeness
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Theorem for first-order logic asserts that consistency is equivalent to satisfiabil-
ity). For example, the axioms and theorems of group theory constitute a theory.
If T is a theory, the satisfaction relationM |= T is defined recursively to meanM
is a model of T , i.e. T is true in M. As examples, G |= axioms of group theory,
for any group G, and R |= (∀x)(∀y)(x ∗ y = y ∗ x). A submodel N of M
is elementary if for any L-formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and a1, . . . , an ∈ N, we have
N |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an) if and only if M |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an); in this case we write
N M. Two models M and N are elementarily equivalent if for any L-sentence
ϕ we have M |= ϕ if and only if N |= ϕ; this is denoted by M ≡ N.
If M is an L structure and A ⊆ M , we can extend the language L to L(A)
by adding a constant symbol a˙ for each a ∈ A. In this case, an L(A)-formula is
simply an L-formula with parameters from A.
Given a language L, two interesting topological spaces arise: the space of
types and the space of L-structures. We shall now introduce them and see how
the Compactness Theorem for first-order logic is equivalent to each of those
spaces being compact.
Definition 2.1 Let M be an L-structure and A ⊆M . A complete n-type over A in
M is a maximal satisfiable set of L(A)-formulas in the variables x1, . . . , xn; i.e.
a set p(x1, . . . , xn) of formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) such that there are a1, . . . , an ∈M
such that for every ϕ ∈ p we have M |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an). The set of all n-types is
denoted by Sn(A).
Give a formula ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), we define
[ϕ] = {p ∈ Sn(A) : ϕ ∈ p}
where the superscript is omitted if it is 1.
Note that all sets of the form [ϕ] form a basis for a topology on Sn. Moreover,
since the negation: ¬ is available in first-order logic, each [ϕ] is clopen. We will
soon be dealing with other logics in which negation is not at our disposal and
the [ϕ]’s will only constitute a basis for the closed sets. Most of the time, it
is enough to study 1-types, and then the same proofs can be carried out for
n-types.
Definition 2.2 Let Str(L) be the set of all equivalence classes under ≡ of L-
structures. For each theory T let [T ] = {M¯ ∈ Str(L) : M |= T } where M¯ is the
equivalence class of M. All the sets of the form [T ] constitute a basis for the
closed sets of the topology on Str(L) known as the space of L -structures. We
write [ϕ] instead of [{ϕ}].
Remark 2.3 Considering equivalence classes under ≡ instead of models is a way
to go around foundational issues: the upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem states
that if a theory has a model of cardinality κ then it has a model of cardinality λ
for every λ ≥ κ. Consequently, dropping the modulo ≡ would make Str(L) and
Mod(T ) proper classes. Considering equivalence classes is equivalent to simply
considering the set of all consistent theories, which is a set of cardinality ≤ 2|L|.
A topological consequence of mod-ing out by ≡ is that we guarantee that the
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topology on Str(L) is Hausdorff. This is not necessarily the case otherwise, since
there could be two different elementarily equivalent structures M and N which
are not topologically distinguishable.
Now we state a result which is a cornerstone of first-order logic:
Theorem 2.4 (The Compactness Theorem) Let T be an L-theory in first-order
logic. If T is finitely satisfiable, i.e. for any ∆ ∈ [T ]<ω there is an L-structure
M∆ satisfying M∆ |= T , then T is consistent.
Proof. Notice that if equivalent L-formulas are identified, we get a Boolean
algebra and then its corresponding Stone space S is compact. An element of
the Stone space is simply a complete L-theory. We prove the contrapositive.
Suppose T is inconsistent and take an enumeration T = {ϕα : α < κ}. Since T
is finitely satisfiable, O = {[¬φα] : α < κ}, where [¬ϕα] = {x ∈ S : ¬ϕα ∈ x}
covers S since
⋂
{[ϕα] : α < κ} = ∅. If {[¬ϕαi ] : i < n} is a finite subcover of O,
then
⋂
{[¬ϕαi ] : i < n} = ∅ and thus {ϕαi : i < n} is a finite inconsistent subset
of T . 
The relationship between the Compactness Theorem and the space of struc-
tures and the space of n-types is fundamental. Basically, a logic satisfies the
Compactness Theorem if and only if its space of structures is compact, and if
and only if its space of n-types is compact. To formulate this precisely, we would
need to formulate precisely what a logic is, as is done for example in [14]. We
won’t do this here; the following two theorems will easily be seen to apply to
whatever logics are considered in this paper.
Theorem 2.5 Given a logic and a language L, every finitely satisfiable set of L-
formulas is satisfiable if and only if the space of L-structures Str(L) is compact.
Proof.⇒) Let {[ϕα] : α < κ} be a centred family (i.e. every finite subfamily has
non-empty intersection) of basic closed sets of Str(L). Since [ϕα]∩ [ϕβ ] = [ϕα ∧
ϕβ ], T = {ϕα : α < κ} is finitely satisfiable. The Compactness Theorem yields
a model M of T , i.e. M ∈
⋂
{[ϕα] : α < κ}. ⇐) If T = {ϕα : α < κ} is finitely
satisfiable, then {[ϕα] : α < κ} is a centred family and any M ∈
⋂
{[ϕα] : α < κ}
is a model of T . 
Theorem 2.6 Given a logic, a language L and a n < ω, every finitely satisfiable
set of L-formulas is satisfiable if and only if the space of types Sn is compact.
Proof.⇒) Let {[ϕα] : α < κ} be a centred family of basic closed sets of S
n.
Then {ϕα : α < κ} is finitely satisfiable, and so it is satisfiable, i.e. there is
an L-structure M with a1, . . . , an ∈ M such that for every α < κ we have
M |= ϕα(a1, . . . , an). By an application of Zorn’s lemma, T can be extended to
an n-type p. Clearly, p ∈
⋂
{[ϕα] : α < κ}. ⇐) If T = {ϕα : α < κ} is finitely
satisfiable then {[ϕα] : α < κ} is a centred family of closed sets in Sn. Take
p ∈
⋂
{[ϕα] : α < κ}; then p is a type and so it is satisfied by a model M. In
particular M |= ϕα for each α < κ. 
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3 Stability and Definability in First-Order Logic
It is a fruitful area of research to consider logics other than first-order logic.
However, one cannot expect the Compactness Theorem to hold in every case.
The following sections are devoted to presenting an exposition of logics with
stronger expressive powers and showing how to use different topological tools
when the Compactness Theorem does not hold.
We first examine the concept of stability which has been a keystone of model
theory since Shelah [32] introduced it. The purpose of this section is to show
that studying stability is a natural way to approach definability.
Definition 3.1 If x is a n-tuple of variables, we write l(x) = n. Let M be an
L-structure, ϕ(x,y) an L-formula where l(x) = n and l(y) = m, A ⊆ M
and b ∈ Mn. An n-ϕ-type over A in M is a set of formulas tpϕ(b, A,M) =
{ϕt(x,a) : a ∈ Am ∧ t < 2 ∧M |= ϕt(b,a)}. Thus, the space of n-ϕ-types is
Snϕ = {tpϕ(b, A,M) : b ∈M
n}. Again, we omit the n from the notation when it
is 1.
Definition 3.2 Let T be an L-theory
(i) A model M of T is stable on an infinite cardinal λ if for every A ⊆ M
such that |A| ≤ λ we have |S(A)| ≤ λ.
(ii) T is stable if all its models are stable.
(iii) An L-formula ϕ ∈ T is stable in M on an infinite cardinal λ if for every
A ⊆M such that |A| ≤ λ we have that |Sϕ(A)| ≤ λ.
Since the previous definition of stability is usually cumbersome to work with,
we present several equivalent definitions. For a more detailed exposition, see
[33]. Despite a superficial resemblance to the concept of stability in Cp-theory,
we have not been able to find a nice connection between the two.
Definition 3.3 An L-formula ϕ(x,y) has the order property in M if there are
sequences 〈ai : i < ω〉 and 〈bj : j < ω〉 of tuples from M such that, for every
i, j < ω, M |= ϕ(ai, bj) if and only if i < j.
Remark 3.4 It is a consequence of the Compactness Theorem and Ramsey’s
Theorem that having the order property is symmetric in x and y, i.e. if ϕ(x,y)
has the order property, so does ϕ(y,x). For a detailed proof of this fact, see
[33] or [36].
Theorem 3.5 Let T be an L-theory. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) T is stable on some λ ≥ ℵ0.
(ii) T is stable on every λ ≥ ℵ0.
(iii) Every formula ϕ(x,y) in T is stable on some λ ≥ ℵ0 in every model of T .
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(iv) Every formula ϕ(x,y) in T is stable on every λ ≥ ℵ0 in every model of
T .
(v) For every formula ϕ(x,y) in T and every model M of T , ϕ does not have
the order property in M.
For a proof see Shelah [33].
We now state the classical theorem from first-order model theory which
relates the concepts of stability and definability.
Definition 3.6 Let M be an L-structure and A,B ⊆M
(i) We say that A is B-definable if there is an L(B)-formula ϕ(x) such that
A = {x ∈M : M |= ϕ(x)}.
(ii) An n-ϕ-type over A in M is B-definable if there is an L-formula ψ(x,y)
and a tuple b from B so that for every a ∈ An, ϕ(x,a) ∈ p if and only if
M |= ψ(a, b).
The following is a classical theorem, the proof of which can be found in the
literature. See for instance, [33] or [36].
Theorem 3.7 (The Definability Theorem) An L-formula ϕ is stable in M if and
only if for every A ⊆M and for every p ∈ Sϕ(A), p is A-definable.
As done in [8] for compact continuous logics, a reasonable scheme for approach-
ing the problem of the definability of Tsirelson-like spaces consists of the fol-
lowing:
(i) Extend the notions of stability and definability from first-order logic to
the logic in question.
(ii) Prove an analogue of the Definability Theorem.
(iii) Establish a relationship between stability and double limit conditions.
This is where Cp-theory plays a fundamental role.
(iv) Decide on the definability in that logic of Tsirelson’s space (or any other
Banach space) by using the double limit condition.
Given a modelM, it is convenient to also view an L-formula ϕ(x, y) as a function
ϕ : M ×M → 2 such that ϕ(a, b) = 1 if and only if M |= ϕ(a, b). Then a ϕ-type
q = tpϕ(a,A,M) can be identified with the function a→ ϕ(a, b) (the ϕ-type is
recovered by taking the pre-image of {1}).
In the following chapters, stability will be defined in terms of double-(ultra)limit
conditions. We remind the reader that if U is an ultrafilter over κ and 〈xα : α <
κ〉 is a κ-sequence, we write limα→U xα = x if for every neighbourhood U of x,
{α : xα ∈ U} ∈ U . As a motivation, we see that this is the case in first-order
logic, following Iovino [20]:
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Lemma 3.8 Let ϕ : A× B → [0, 1] be a function, 〈an : n < ω〉 and 〈bm : m < ω〉
be sequences in A and B respectively and U and V ultrafilters on ω. If
lim
n→U
lim
m→V
ϕ(an, bm) = α and lim
m→V
lim
n→U
ϕ(an, bm) = β
then there are subsequences 〈ani : i < ω〉 and 〈bmj : j < ω〉 such that
lim
i<j
i→∞
ϕ(ani , bmj ) = α and lim
j<i
j→∞
ϕ(ani , bmj ) = β.
Proof. Given ε > 0 we have
(i) (∃Uε ∈ U)(∀n ∈ Uε)| limm→V ϕ(an, bm)− α| < ε
(ii) (∃Vε ∈ V )(∀m ∈ Vε)| limn→U ϕ(an, bm)− β| < ε
(iii) (∀m < ω)(∃Umε ∈ U)(∀n ∈ U
m
ε )|ϕ(an, bm)− limn→U ϕ(an, bm)| < ε.
(iv) (∀n < ω)(∃Vnε ∈ V)(∀m ∈ V
n
ε )|ϕ(an, bm)− limm→V ϕ(an, bm)| < ε.
Notice that (i) and (ii) follow from the convergence hypothesis, and (iii) and
(iv) follow from the compactness of [0,1]. Construct recursively two increasing
sequences 〈ni : i < ω〉 and 〈mj : j < ω〉 such that n0 ∈ U1, m0 ∈ V1 ∩ V
n0
1 and
ni ∈ U1/i+1 ∩
⋂
k<i U
mk
1/i+1 and mj ∈ U1/j+1 ∩
⋂
k≤j V
nk
1/j+1. Now consider
the subsequences 〈ani : i < ω〉 and 〈bmj : j < ω〉. The construction shows that
lim i<j
i→∞
ϕ(ani , bmj) = α and similarly lim j<i
j→∞
ϕ(ani , bmj ) = β. 
The previous result is used in [20] to prove:
Theorem 3.9 Given a formula ϕ(x, y), the following are equivalent:
(i) ϕ(x, y) is stable.
(ii) For any sequences 〈an : n < ω〉 and 〈bm : m < ω〉 inM , and any ultrafilters
U and V on ω, limn→U limm→V ϕ(an, bm) = limm→V limn→U ϕ(an, bm).
Proof. (ii)→ (i) Assume that ϕ has the order property witnessed by 〈an : n < ω〉
and 〈bm : m < ω〉. Then limm→∞ ϕ(an, bm) = limm→V ϕ(an, bm) = 1 for any
fixed n < ω. Similarly, limn→∞ ϕ(an, bm) = limn→U ϕ(an, bm) = 0 for any fixed
m < ω. So limn→U limm→V ϕ(an, bm) = 1 and limm→V limn→U ϕ(an, bm) = 0.
(i) → (ii) By the lemma, there are subsequences 〈ani : i < ω〉 and 〈bmj : j < ω〉
such that:
lim
i<j
i→∞
ϕ(ani , bmj) = 1 and lim
j<i
j→∞
ϕ(ani , bmj) = 0
Equivalently, there are N0, N1 < ω such that if j > i > N0, then ϕ(ani , bmj ) = 1
and if i > j > N1, then ϕ(ani , bmj ) = 0. If N is bigger than both N0 and N1,
then 〈ani : i < N〉 and 〈bmj : j < N〉 witness that ϕ has the order property. If
the limits have the other possible values, use Remark 3.4. 
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4 Continuous Logics for Metric Structures
The logics that we will consider have their motivation in overcoming some noto-
rious limitations of first-order logic, namely that the only possible truth values
lie in {0, 1}, leaving little room for the usual ε-play and approximations which
are fundamental in analysis, and that only finite conjunctions are allowed, re-
stricting certain recursive definitions. We will first look at continuous logics,
particularly logics for metric structures, where the first limitation is overcome
by allowing each real in [0, 1] as a possible truth value. We will deal with the
second difficulty later when we introduce the continuous version of Lω1,ω, in
which countable conjunctions are allowed. The origins of continuous logic lie in
W. Henson’s approximate satisfaction [18]. A [0, 1]-valued logic called continu-
ous first-order logic has been an active area of research for the last decade since
it was introduced by I. Ben Yaacov and A. Usvyatsov [6] following ideas of C.
C. Chang and H. J. Keisler [10], and Henson and Iovino [19]. We will deal with
variations and generalizations introduced by Ben Yaacov and Iovino [5] and C.
J. Eagle [12], following mostly the last one.
For the topologist reader who is not so interested in analysis, we emphasize
that we could just consider the usual first-order logic (and later, Lω1,ω). We
then do not have to worry about continuous connectives, non-trivial metric
structures, unexpected definitions of definability, etc. We will still use non-
trivial theorems of Cp-theory concerning Cp(X, 2), and prove non-trivial new
results about definability in the 2-valued infinitary logic Lω1,ω.
In the discrete case, the interpretation in a model M of an n-ary relation,
also called an n-ary predicate, was defined as a subset of Mn and so it can also
be regarded as a function Mn → 2 in the natural way. We see that this last
option is the most natural one in the continuous case.
Definition 4.1 Assume for the sake of notational simplicity that all metric struc-
tures have diameter 1.
(i) If (M,d) and (N, ρ) are metric spaces and f : Mn → N is uniformly con-
tinuous, a modulus of uniform continuity of f is a function δ : (0, 1)∩Q→
(0, 1) ∩ Q such that whenever x = (a1, ..., an),y = (b1, ..., bn) ∈ Mn and
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q, sup{d(ai, bi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} < δ(ε) implies ρ(f(x), f(y)) < ε.
(ii) A language for metric structures is a set L which consists of constants,
functions with an associated arity and a modulus of uniform continuity,
predicates with an associated arity and a modulus of uniform continuity,
and a symbol d for a metric.
(iii) An L-metric structure M is a metric space (M,dM ) together with in-
terpretations for each symbol in L: cM ∈ M for each constant c ∈ L;
fM : Mn → M is an uniformly continuous function for each n-ary func-
tion symbol f ∈ L; PM : Mn → [0, 1] is an uniformly continuous function
for each n-ary predicate symbol P ∈ L.
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From now on, we will be mostly interested in languages for metric structures so
we will write language instead of language for metric structures whenever there
is no room for confusion.
Now we proceed to define the continuous analogue of first-order logic in the
context of metric structures. The definition will be recursive and relies on the
notion of syntactical objects called terms. We will present the continuous case
here following [12]; for an exposition of this in the discrete case, see [36].
Definition 4.2 Suppose {xn : n < ω} is a set of variables and fix a language L.
Continuous first-order logic L-terms are defined as follows: All variables and
constants are L-terms. If t1, . . . , tn are L-terms and f is an n-ary function
symbol, then f(t1, . . . , tn) is an L-term.
The interpretation of a term in a metric structure is defined recursively in the
natural way. As we discussed in Section 2, a formula ϕ can also be seen as
a function such that for a structure M and a ∈ M, ϕ(a) = 1 if and only if
M |= ϕ(a). For an L-sentence ϕ we write M |= ϕ if and only if ϕ(a) = 1 for
every a ∈M .
Definition 4.3 Let L be a language for metric structures. The continuous first-
order logic L-formulas are defined recursively as follows:
(i) Whenever t1 and t2 are L-terms, d(t1, t2) is an L-formula.
(ii) If t1, . . . , tn are L-terms and P an n-ary predicate symbol, then P (t1, . . . , tn)
is an L-formula.
(iii) If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are L-formulas and g : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] is continuous, then
g(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is an L-formula.
(iv) If ϕ is an L-formula and x is a variable, then supxϕ and infxϕ are L-
formulas.
Remark 4.4
(i) supxϕ and infxϕ can be thought as the quantifiers analogous to ∀ and ∃.
However, they are not quite the same: infxϕ = 1 means that for every
n < ω there is an x such that ϕ(x) > 1 − 1n , which does not imply that
there is an x such that ϕ(x) = 1.
(ii) If M is an L-structure we have M |= min{ϕ, ψ} if and only if M |= ϕ and
M |= ψ. Analogously, M |= max{ϕ, ψ} if and only if M |= ϕ or M |= ψ.
We will write ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ ∨ ψ freely. In addition, continuous functions
are also introduced as connectives. Notice that only finitary formulas are
allowed.
(iii) We can express that the equality a1 = a2 holds in a given M by saying
M |= “1−d(a1, a2)”, as this means dM(aM1 , a
M
2 ) = 0 where d
M is a metric
so aM1 = a
M
2 .
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(iv) One of the main differences that occurs when considering continuous logics
is that negation is usually not available, i.e. given a formula ϕ, there is not
necessarily a formula ψ such that M |= ϕ if and only if M 6|= ψ. We will
see in Section 6 that negation seems to require an infinitary disjunction
to be expressed.
(v) All formulas from discrete first-order logic can easily be translated into
formulas of continuous first-order logic. See [9] for a detailed discussion.
In Section 6, we will see an example of a formula that cannot be written
in discrete first-order logic, but allows us to approximate estimates among
norms involved in the construction of Tsirelson’s space.
(vi) In general, the relation ∈ from the language of set theory does not belong
to languages for metric structures and so it does not appear in formulas
in these languages. As a consequence, an object that can be defined in
ZFC, using the axiom of choice for instance, might not be definable in
a given language for metric structures. The point of Gowers’ problem,
however, is to ask whether a space like Tsirelson’s can be defined using
ordinary analytic notions, which we take to mean whether it is definable in
a language suitable for talking about such analytic notions, as contrasted
with a language that arguably is suitable for discussing all of mathematics,
but not necessarily in a pleasing, transparent way.
We restate the Compactness Theorem for continuous first-order logic and omit
the proof as it is analogous to the discrete case.
Theorem 4.5 Let L be a language for metric structures and T a theory in con-
tinuous first-order logic. If T is finitely satisfiable then T is consistent.
The general definition of a logic is one that varies from author to author and
requires a discussion of foundational issues that might arise. We omit such a
general definition in favour of an intuitive description which fits the purposes of
working with compact continuous logics and continuous Lω1,ω (defined below).
A logic for metric structures L assigns to each language for metric structures L
the set Sent(L) of all the sentences together with the space of structures Str(L)
as defined in Section 1, and a function Val : Str(L) × Sent(L)→ [0, 1] given by
Val(M, ϕ) = ϕ(a) where a is any element of M ; Val assigns to each pair (M, ϕ)
the truth value of ϕ in M according to L.
In what follows, we will only be interested in languages for metric structures,
regardless of the logic. As a consequence, we can regard each case as a natural
generalization of discrete first-order logic: if L is a language, an L-structure M
is discrete if it is based on a discrete metric space (M,d) and for every L(M)-
sentence ϕ we have either M |= ϕ or M |= 1 − ϕ. Thus, first-order logic is a
special case of what we are considering here. The work of Casazza and Iovino
[8] on the undefinability of Tsirelson’s space is centred around the notion of
(finitary) compact continuous logics, i.e. logics for metric structures for which
Str(L) is compact.
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5 Cp-Theory meets Continuous Model Theory
Given a topological space X , we will denote by Cp(X) the space of continuous
real-valued functions from X with the pointwise convergence topology, i.e. the
topology induced on Cp(X) as a subspace of the product topology on [0, 1]
X .
For our purposes, we will only be interested in sets of functions from X to [0, 1]
and their closures. The properties we will deal with are inherited by closed
subspaces of Cp(X) and so no difficulty will arise if one considers the closed
subspace Cp(X, [0, 1]) of continuous functions from X to [0, 1] instead of Cp(X).
Unless otherwise specified, we suppose that we are working with an arbitrary
logic for metric structures in this section.
Some definitions and statements differ from the original ones in [8] as those
are aimed at the compact case on which their work is centred. Surprisingly, the
discrete version of what is proved in [8] or here for continuous logic is not much
easier to prove; the reason for this is that Cp(X, 2) is not much simpler than
Cp(X, [0, 1]).
We first introduce the formulas in two variables which will occupy our at-
tention.
Definition 5.1
(i) Let L be a language. L′ ⊇ L is a language for pairs of structures from
L if L′ includes two disjoint copies L0 and L1 of L and there is a map
Str(L) × Str(L) → Str(L′) which assigns to every pair of L-structures
(M,N) an L′-structure 〈M,N〉, where M is an L0-structure and N is an
L1-structure. We say that L
′ is a language for pairs of structures if it is
so for some L.
(ii) If L′ is a language for pairs of structures from L and X,Y are function
symbols from L, we say that a formula ϕ(X,Y ) is a formula for pairs
of structures from L if (M,N) 7→ ϕ(XM, Y N) = Val(ϕ(X,Y ), 〈M,N〉) is
separately continuous on Str(L) × Str(L). For notational simplicity, we
will write ϕ(M,N) instead of Val(ϕ(X,Y ), 〈M,N〉).
The definition of formulas for pairs of structures is useful for comparing norms
on the same metric space. Consider for example a set C of structures which are
normed spaces (c00, ‖ ‖) based on c00, i.e. the structures (c00, ‖ ‖l1 , ‖ ‖ , e0, e1, ...)
where ‖ ‖ is a function symbol in L for an arbitrary norm and {en : n < ω} is
the standard vector basis of c00. Let L
′ be a language including two disjoint
copies of L; then two different L-structures (c00, ‖ ‖1) and (c00, ‖ ‖2) can be
coded as the single L′-structure (c00, ‖ ‖1 , ‖ ‖2). In this section, “language” will
mean “language for pairs of structures”. For the purposes of [8], X and Y will
always represent function symbols for norms.
Definition 5.2 Let L be a language and ϕ a formula for pairs of structures
(i) The left ϕ-type of M is the function ltpϕ,M : Str(L) → [0, 1] given by
ltpϕ,M(N) = ϕ(M,N). The space of left ϕ-types Slϕ is the closure of
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{ltpϕ,M : M ∈ Str(L)} in Cp(Str(L)). If C is a subset of Str(L) then Slϕ[C]
is the closure of {ltpϕ,M : M ∈ C} in Cp(C), called “the space of left ϕ-types
over C”.
(ii) The right ϕ-type of N is the function rtpϕ,N : Str(L) → [0, 1] given by
rtpϕ,N(N) = ϕ(M,N). The spaces Srϕ and S
r
ϕ[C] are defined analogously.
Remark 5.3 As in the discrete case, one can recover the left ϕ-type in the classical
sense by considering (ltpϕ,M)
−1{1}.
Proposition 5.4 If L is a compact logic then Slϕ and S
r
ϕ are compact.
Proof. If f is a limit point of Slϕ, then there is a cardinal κ, an ultrafilter U
over κ and a sequence 〈Mα : α < κ〉 in Str(L) such that limα→U ltpϕ,Mα = f .
To see this, let κ be the cardinality of the neighbourhood filter F at f , take
an ultrafilter U extending F and pick a point in each member of F . The trace
of U on this κ-sequence U-converges to f . Since Str(L) is compact and ϕ is
separately continuous, there is an M ∈ Str(L) such that limα→U Mα = M and
for any N ∈ Str(L), limα→U ϕ(Mα,N) = ϕ(M,N) = ltpϕ,M ∈ Slϕ. Then S
l
ϕ is
a closed subset of [0, 1]Str(L). 
Definition 5.5 Let C be a subset of Str(L) and suppose {Mα : α < κ} ⊆ C is such
that t = ltpϕ,M, then we say that M is a realization of t in C and t is a left
ϕ-type of M over C.
We have just showed that the classical result stating that, when the logic is
compact, for every type there is a model in which the type is realized, holds in
the continuous case. Notice that Str(L) can be replaced by any closed subset
and the result still holds with the same proof.
Now we are ready to introduce the essential concept of stability in continuous
logics:
Definition 5.6 Let C ⊆ Str(L). A formula for pairs of structures ϕ is stable on
C if and only if whenever 〈Mi : i < ω〉 and 〈N : j < ω〉 are sequences in C and
U and V ultrafilters on ω, respectively, we have
lim
i→U
lim
j→V
ϕ(Mi,Nj) = lim
j→V
lim
i→U
ϕ(Mi,Nj).
Now we can state a Cp-theoretic result of V. Pta´k [29] (see also S. Todorce-
vic [39]) and the respective model-theoretic version which gives an important
characterization of stability:
Theorem 5.7 (Pta´k) If X is compact then a pointwise bounded A ⊆ Cp(X) has
a compact closure if and only if it satisfies the following double limit condi-
tion: whenever 〈fn : n < ω〉 and 〈xn : n < ω〉 are sequences in A and X respec-
tively, the double limits limn→∞ limm→∞ fn(xm) and limm→∞ limn→∞ fn(xm)
are equal whenever they both exist.
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Theorem 5.8 Let L be a language for pairs of structures, ϕ an L-formula for
pairs of structures and C ⊆ Str(L) be compact. Then, the following are equiva-
lent:
(i) ϕ is stable on C.
(ii) There is a separately continuous function F : Slϕ[C] × S
r
ϕ[C] → [0, 1] such
that F (ltpϕ,M, rtpϕ,N) = ϕ(M,N) for every M,N ∈ Str(L).
Proof. (ii) → (i) is immediate. (i) → (ii): We have A = {ltpϕ,M : M ∈ C} ⊆
Cp(Str(L)). Also, S
l
ϕ[C] = A¯ ∩ Cp(Str(L)). Clearly, stability implies the dou-
ble limit condition of Pta´k’s theorem and so Slϕ[C] is compact. By symmetry,
F (ltpϕ,M, rtpϕ,N) = ϕ(M,N) is separately continuous. 
Now we can introduce the notion of definability:
Definition 5.9 Let L be a language for pairs of structures, ϕ be a formula for pairs
of structures and C ⊆ Str(L). A function τ : Srϕ[C]→ [0, 1] is a left global ϕ-type
over C if there is a sequence 〈Mα : α < κ〉 in C such that for every type t ∈ Srϕ,
say t = limβ→V rtpϕ,Nβ , we have τ(t) = limα→U limβ→V φ(Mα,Nβ). We say
that τ is explicitly definable if it is continuous. If a left ϕ-type p ∈ Slϕ[C] is given
by p = limα→U ltpϕ,Mα, we say that p is explicitly definable if τ : S
r
ϕ → [0, 1]
given by τ(t) = limα→U limβ→V ϕ(Mα,Nβ) yields an explicitly definable left
global ϕ-type.
The previous definition is sound because the continuity of τ makes it into an
allowable formula which determines, as in the discrete case, which formulas
belong to the type t, by taking the pre-image of 1 as usual.
Now Pta´k’s theorem (or its model-theoretic version) can be restated as the
equivalence between stability and definability in compact continuous logics, fol-
lowing [8]:
Theorem 5.10 Let L be a compact logic, L a language for pairs of structures,
C ⊆ Str(L) compact and ϕ a formula for pairs of structures. Then, the following
are equivalent:
(i) ϕ is stable on C.
(ii) If τ is a global left (or right) ϕ-type over C, then τ is explicitly definable.
(iii) For every L-structure M, the left and right ϕ-types of M are explicitly
definable.
This model-theoretic machinery that is built upon Cp-theoretic results consti-
tutes the grounds on which Casazza and Iovino proved the undefinability of
Tsirelson’s space from sets of Banach spaces including lp or c0 in compact con-
tinuous logics. Most of the remainder of the proof of this fact involves analysis
rather than model theory or topology so the interested reader is referred to [8].
Pta´k’s theorem relies on a well-known theorem of Grothendieck which states
that, when X is countably compact, the closure of any A ⊆ Cp(X) which is
14
countably compact in Cp(X) (every infinite subset of A has a limit point in
Cp(X)) is compact. The spaces for which this property holds, i.e. the clo-
sure of any subspace which is countably compact in Cp(X) is compact, will be
called weakly Grothendieck spaces; when Cp(X) has this property hereditarily,
we say that X is a Grothendieck space. Grothendieck spaces have turned out
to be relevant in work in progress concerning definability, allowing one to prove
stronger results, but they are not involved in what we present here and so we
work only with weakly Grothendieck spaces. See [4] for a more detailed discus-
sion on variations of Grothendieck spaces. Notice that Cp(X, [0, 1]) is a closed
subspace of Cp(X) and so if X is a (weakly) Grothendieck space, any closed
countably compact subset of Cp(X, [0, 1]) is compact. Similarly, Cp(X, 2) is a
closed subspace of Cp(X, [0, 1]) and so one may deduce similar conclusions.
The main problem to be overcome in order to find an analogue of the previous
definability theorem is to find conditions on a space X so that A¯∩Cp(X) being
compact is equivalent to a double (ultra)limit condition as in Pta´k’s theorem.
A natural place to start is to consider weakly Grothendieck spaces in order to
test statements such as the ones in [8] in the context of logics for which the
space of types is weakly Grothendieck, thus generalizing the compact case.
Problem 1: What conditions are to be satisfied by X so that it is a weakly
Grothendieck space?
There is a variety of disparate conditions which implyX is a weakly Grothendieck
space: A. V. Arhangel’ski˘ı showed in [4] that all Lindelo¨f Σ-spaces (i.e. contin-
uous images of spaces that can be perfectly mapped onto separable metrizable
spaces) are weakly Grothendieck, and V. Tkachuk [37] proved that every σ-
compact space is weakly Grothendieck. We collect some of these results in the
following theorem:
Theorem 5.11 A space X is weakly Grothendieck if it satisfies any of the follow-
ing conditions:
(i) X is countably compact.
(ii) X is σ-compact.
(iii) X is Lindelo¨f Σ.
Theorem 5.11 (i) is Grothendieck’s theorem. The proof of Theorem 5.11 (ii) can
be reduced to (iii) as every σ-compact space is Lindelo¨f Σ - see [37]. The proof
for the case in which X is Lindelo¨f Σ follows from a variation by Arhangel’ski˘ı
of a famous theorem of Baturov (see [2] and [3]).
Remark 5.12 It is a non-trivial fact that if Y is a dense subspace of X and Y is
Grothendieck, then X is Grothendieck; the proof requires the full strength of be-
ing a Grothendieck space; see, for instance, [4]. Then, for Grothendieck spaces,
we can restrict our attention to dense subspaces in Theorem 5.11. More specifi-
cally, we have: if having a property P implies that X is Grothendieck, then hav-
ing a dense subspace with the property P also implies that X is Grothendieck.
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So, if X is Hausdorff k-separable, i.e. has a dense σ-compact subspace, then it
is Grothendieck because Lindelo¨f Σ spaces, in particular σ-compact spaces, are
Grothendieck (see [4]). We thank V. V. Tkachuk for pointing this out to us. In
the next section, we will be able to extend results in [8] for logics for which the
spaces of types are weakly Grothendieck and first countable. As an example,
we will work with countable fragments of a continuous infinitary logic, Lω1,ω,
for which the spaces of types are metrizable and separable, in which case they
have a σ-compact dense subspace and thus are (weakly) Grothendieck.
The separable case follows from our previous discussion: countable spaces are
Grothendieck since they are σ-compact. By having a Grothendieck dense sub-
space, separable spaces are Grothendieck.
It can be seen in Arhangel’ski˘ı [3] that the conditions in theorem 5.11 can
yield stronger results, e.g. if X is countably compact, then being pointwise
bounded is enough for a subset of Cp(X) to have compact closure. Moreover,
if A is countably compact in Cp(X) for countably compact X , then, if A¯ is the
closure of A in RX , then the closure A¯ ∩Cp(X) is an Eberlein compactum (i.e.
metrizable and homeomorphic to a compact subset of Cp(Y ) for some compact
metrizable Y ). This motivates the following problem:
Problem 2: Find weaker conditions under which the closure of subspaces that
are countably compact in Cp(X) are just compact.
Answers to the previous questions would light the road towards extending the
results of Casazza and Iovino to further logics. In [8], most results assume that
the logic is countably compact as this allows them to work only with sequences
and ultrafilters over ω. This is useful because it allows one to use Theorem 3.8
to test stability (and definability). In the next section, we generalize some of
these results for logics for which the space of types is a first countable weakly
Grothendieck space.
6 Infinitary Continuous Logics and Final Remarks
In this section we present a double (ultra) limits condition which is equivalent to
A¯ ∩Cp(X) being compact when X is first countable and weakly Grothendieck.
As an application, we extend some results from [8] to non-compact continuous
logics with more expressive power for doing analysis.
Recall that a subspace Y of an space X is relatively compact if Y¯ is compact
in X .
Theorem 6.1 Suppose X is a first countable weakly Grothendieck space. If A
is a subset of Cp(X, [0, 1]), then A is relatively compact in Cp(X) if and only
if it satisfies the following double limit condition: for every pair of sequences
〈fn : n < ω〉 and 〈xm : m < ω〉 and ultrafilters U and V in βω
lim
n→U
lim
m→V
fn(xm) = lim
m→V
lim
n→U
fn(xm)
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whenever the limit limm→V xm exists.
Proof. Suppose A¯ ∩ Cp(X) is not compact in Cp(X). Then A¯ ∩ Cp(X) is not
countably compact, so let 〈fn : n < ω〉 be a sequence in A with no limit points
in A¯ ∩ Cp(X). Notice that A¯ is compact in [0, 1]X since it is a closed subset,
so each ultralimit of the sequence exists, is a limit point and is discontinuous.
Take a non-principal ultrafilter U over ω and let limn→U fn = g. Notice that g
is discontinuous by assumption. Then there is an ε > 0 and a y ∈ X such that
for every neighborhood U of y, there is a y′ ∈ U such that |g(y) − g(y′)| > ε.
Let B be a local base at y and consider B′ = {∩S : S ∈ [B]<ω}. Clearly B′ is
also a local base at y. Take an enumeration B′ = {Bm : m < ω} and, for each
m < ω, choose xm ∈ Bm such that |g(xm) − g(y)| > ε. Now, for every k < ω
let Ak = {m < ω : xm ∈ Bk}; notice that {Ak : k < ω} is centred so it can be
extended to an ultrafilter V ∈ βω. Let U be a neighbourhood of y and let k < ω
be such that Bk ⊆ U . Then Ak ⊆ {m < ω : xm ∈ U}. Thus, limm→V xm = y
and
lim
n→U
lim
m→V
fn(xm) = g(y)
since each fn is continuous. On the other hand, limm→V limn→U fn(xm) =
limm→V g(xm) exists by the compactness of [0, 1]. However by our construction,
|g(xm)−g(y)| > ε for everym < ω. Then the ultralimits limn→U limm→V fn(xα)
and limm→V limn→U fn(xm) are different, a contradiction. Conversely, sup-
pose limm→V xm exists and A¯ ∩ Cp(X) is compact. Then for any sequence
〈fn : n < ω〉 in A and ultrafilter U over ω, there is a continuous g = limn→U fn.
Thus we have that limn→U limm→V fn(xm) = limn→U fn(y) = g(y) and also
that limm→V limn→U fn(xm) = limm→V fm(y) = g(y). 
“First countability” is not best, but is convenient to use. In work in progress,
we aim for the optimal hypotheses for Theorem 6.1. Now we can restate Theo-
rem 6.1 as a model-theoretic result:
Theorem 6.2 Let L be a logic, L a language, and suppose C ⊆ Str(L) is such
that the space of ϕ-types on C is first countable and weakly Grothendieck. Then,
the following are equivalent:
(i) Whenever a left type over C is given by t = limi→U ltpϕ,Mi and 〈Nj : j < ω〉
is a sequence in C and V ∈ βω we have
lim
i→U
lim
j→V
ϕ(Mi,Nj) = lim
j→V
lim
i→U
ϕ(Mi,Nj).
(ii) Whenever a left type is given by t = limi→U ltpϕ,Mi and 〈Nj : j < ω〉 is a
sequence in C we have
supi<jϕ(Mi,Nj) = infj<iϕ(Mi,Nj).
(iii) If τ is a left ϕ-type over C then τ is explicitly definable.
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Proof. That (i) and (ii) are equivalent follows from Lemma 3.8. Let 〈Nα : α < κ〉
be a κ-sequence in C. If τ(limi→U ltpϕ,Mi) = limi→U limα→V ϕ(Mi,Nα) defines
a global ϕ-type where V is an ultrafilter over κ define fα : Slϕ[C] → [0, 1] by
fα(limi→U ltpϕ,Mi) = limi→U ϕ(Mi,Nα). Then A = {fα : α < κ} is a subset of
Cp(S
l
ϕ[C], [0, 1]) and satisfies the double ultralimit condition from the previous
theorem. Then A¯∩Cp(Slϕ[C], [0, 1]) is compact and τ = limα→V fj is continuous.
That (iii) implies (i) is immediate. 
Let C be the set of all structures which are normed spaces based on c00. We
introduce the continuous logic formula for pairs of structures used in [8]: for
norms ‖ ‖1 and ‖ ‖2, let
D(‖ ‖1 , ‖ ‖2) = sup
{
‖x‖1
‖x‖2
: ‖x‖l1 = 1
}
.
Then let
ϕ(‖ ‖1 , ‖ ‖2) =
logD(‖ ‖1 , ‖ ‖2)
1 + logD(‖ ‖1 , ‖ ‖2)
.
It is not difficult to see that if t = limi→U ltpφ,‖ ‖
i
is realized by a structure
(M, ‖ ‖∗), then
lim
i→U
sup
‖x‖
l1
=1
‖x‖i
‖x‖
= sup
‖x‖
l1
=1
‖x‖∗
‖x‖
. (1)
for any structure (c00, ‖x‖) in C. In particular, taking ‖ ‖l1 = ‖ ‖ yields, for
each x ∈ c00, limi→U ‖x‖i = ‖x‖∗. If in addition ‖ ‖1 ≤ ‖ ‖2 · · · ≤ ‖x‖n . . . ,
then limi→∞ ‖x‖i = ‖x‖∗. Conversely, if ‖ ‖1 ≤ ‖ ‖2 · · · ≤ ‖x‖n . . . and also
limi→∞ ‖x‖i = ‖x‖∗for every x ∈ c00, then (1) holds for any (c00, ‖ ‖) in C and
any nonprincipal ultrafilter U over ω.
This motivates the following definition from [8]:
Definition 6.3 Let C be the set of all structures which are normed spaces based
on c00, ϕ a formula for a pair of structures and ‖ ‖∗ be a norm on c00.
(i) If {‖ ‖i : i < ω} is a family of norms on c00 we say that {ltpϕ,‖ ‖i : i < ω}
determines ‖x‖∗ uniquely if for every U ∈ βω, t = limi→U ltpϕ,‖ ‖i is
realized and ‖ ‖∗ is its unique realization.
(ii) We say that ‖ ‖∗ is uniquely determined by its ϕ-type over C if there is a
family of norms {‖ ‖i : i < ω} on c00 such that {ltpϕ,‖ ‖i : i < ω} deter-
mines ‖ ‖∗ uniquely.
Notice that if ‖ ‖i denotes the i-th iterate of the Tsirelson norm and ‖ ‖T is the
Tsirelson norm, then limi→∞ ‖x‖i = ‖x‖T for each x ∈ c00 and so we have the
following result from [8]:
Proposition 6.4 Let L be a logic for metric structures, L a language for pairs of
structures, C the class of structures (c00, ‖ ‖l1 , ‖ ‖) such that the norm comple-
tion of (c00, ‖ ‖) is a Banach space including lp or c00 and let ϕ(X,Y ) be the for-
mula defined above. Suppose {(c00, ‖ ‖l1 , ‖ ‖i) : i < ω} is a family of structures
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in C such that ‖ ‖1 ≤ ‖ ‖2 · · · ≤ ‖x‖n . . . and the ϕ-type t = limi→U ltpϕ,‖ ‖i
is realized by (c00, ‖ ‖l1 , ‖ ‖∗) in Str(L), then {ltpϕ,‖ ‖i : i < ω} determines
uniquely ‖ ‖∗ over C. In particular, the Tsirelson norm is uniquely determined
by its ϕ-type over C.
The following result is proved in [8] and is purely analytical:
Proposition 6.5 Let ‖ ‖i be the i-th iterate in the construction of the Tsirelson
norm. Then the following hold:
(i) sup
‖x‖l1
=1
‖x‖i
‖x‖j
≤ 1 for i < j.
(ii) sup
‖x‖
l1
=1
‖x‖i
‖x‖j
≥ j for i > j.
Thus, sup
i<j
ϕ(‖ ‖i , ‖ ‖j) 6= inf
j<i
ϕ(‖ ‖i , ‖ ‖j).
Theorem 6.6 Let L be a logic for which the space of types is first countable and
weakly Grothendieck, let L be a language for pairs of structures, let C be the
class of structures (c00, ‖ ‖l1 , ‖ ‖) such that the norm completion of (c00, ‖ ‖) is
a Banach space including lp or c0, and let ‖ ‖T be the Tsirelson norm. Then
there is a formula for pairs of structures φ such that ‖ ‖T is uniquely determined
by its ϕ-type over C and that ϕ-type is not explicitly definable over C.
Remark 6.7 The previous result states that, although Tsirelson’s space T is con-
structed via a limiting process involving only explicitly definable spaces based
on c00, the completions of which include lp or c0, T itself is not explicitly defin-
able. A much more general result is proved in [8] for countably compact logics,
namely: if a space is explicitly definable from a class of spaces based on c00
which include lp or c0, then it must also include lp or c0.
Now we will introduce a continuous infinitary logic which extends the com-
pact case, and we will use our Cp-theoretic results to prove the undefinability of
Tsirelson’s space in this logic.
In discrete model theory, there are natural generalizations of first-order logic
denoted by Lκ,ω where κ is an infinite cardinal. Lκ,ω is a logic satisfying:
(i) All first-order formulas are formulas in Lκ,ω.
(ii) If λ < κ and χ = {ϕα : α < λ} is a subset of formulas in Lκ,ω, then ∧χ
and ∨χ are also formulas in Lκ,ω.
(iii) If ϕ is a formula in Lκ,ω, then (∃x)ϕ(x) and (∀x)ϕ(x) are formulas in
Lκ,ω.
One of the main differences between Lκ,ω for κ > ω and first-order logic (Lω,ω) is
that the compactness theorem does not hold. Moreover, if a weak version of the
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Compactness Theorem holds for Lκ,ω, namely if whenever T is a theory in Lκ,ω
such that if every subsets of T of size < κ is satisfiable then T is satisfiable, then
κ is a weakly compact cardinal and so cannot be proved to exist in ZFC. See,
for instance, [22] and [23]. Thus, in general, one has to do without compactness.
The omitting types theorem (an analogue of the Baire category theorem), is a
useful substitute. For an in-depth study of this result in abstract logics, see [14].
Here, we will present Lω1,ω, its continuous version, and some of their topo-
logical aspects following Eagle [12]. Many concepts useful for analysis can be
defined in continuous Lω1,ω, but cannot be defined in the usual continuous logic
[12].
Definition 6.8 Let L be a language for metric structures. The formulas of Lω1,ω(L)
or Lω1,ω(L)-formulas are defined recursively as follows:
(i) All first-order L-formulas are Lω1,ω(L)-formulas.
(ii) If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are Lω1,ω(L)-formulas and g : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] is continuous
then g(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is an Lω1,ω(L)-formula.
(iii) If {ϕn : n < ω} is a family of Lω1,ω(S)-formulas, then infnϕn and supnϕn
are Lω1,ω(L)-formulas. These can be also denoted as ∧nϕn and ∨nϕn
respectively.
(iv) If ϕ is an Lω1,ω(L)-formula and x is a variable, then infxϕ and supxϕ are
Lω1,ω(L)-formulas.
An interesting feature of continuous Lω1,ω is that negation (¬) becomes available
in the classical sense [12]: if L is a language and ϕ is an Lω1,ω(L)-formula, then
we can define: ψ(x) = ∨n{ϕ(x) +
1
n , 1}. Then, M |= ψ(a) if and only if there
is an n < ω such that M |= max{ϕ(a) + 1n , 1}; this is max{ϕ(a) +
1
n , 1} = 1,
which is the same as ϕ(a) ≤ 1− 1n , i.e. M 6|= ϕ(a). Then, M |= ψ(x) if and
only if M 6|= ϕ(x), and so ψ corresponds to ¬ϕ.
It is sometimes useful to restrict one’s attention to (countable) fragments of
Lω1,ω(S), which are easier to work with than the full logic.
Definition 6.9 Let L be a language. A fragment F of Lω1,ω(L) is a set of
Lω1,ω(L)-formulas satisfying:
(i) Every first-order formula is in F .
(ii) F is closed under finitary conjunctions and disjunctions.
(iii) F is closed under infx and supx.
(iv) F is closed under subformulas.
(v) F is closed under substituting terms for free variables.
20
Notice that every subset of Lω1,ω(L) generates a fragment, and that every finite
set of formulas generates a countable fragment. There are two arguments to
support the idea of working with countable fragments of Lω1,ω(L): firstly, notice
that a given proof involves only finitely many formulas which then generate a
countable fragment of Lω1,ω(L). Secondly (as noted independently by C. J.
Eagle (personal communication)), if an object is definable in Lω1,ω(L), then it
is definable in a countable fragment by the same argument.
As the work of Casazza and Iovino deals with continuous logics which are
finitary in nature, it is natural to ask whether their result on the undefinability
of Tsirelson’s space can be proved for continuous Lω1,ω, which is arguably a
more natural language from the point of view of Banach space theorists.
In discrete model theory, countable fragments of Lω1,ω have been studied
previously, for instance M. Morley [27] showed that the space of types of a
countable fragment of Lω1,ω is Polish.
Remark 6.10 In the continuous case, we note that the space of types of a count-
able fragment F of continuous Lω1,ω(L) can be seen as a subspace of [0, 1]
F ,
which is metrizable and second countable, and so it is separable – hence it is
Grothendieck – and first countable.
The following result follows from Theorem 6.7 and Remark 6.11:
Theorem 6.11 Let L be a language for pairs of structures, C the class of struc-
tures (c00, ‖ ‖l1 , ‖ ‖) such that the norm completion of (c00, ‖ ‖) includes lp or
c0 and let ‖ ‖T be the Tsirelson norm. Then there is an Lω1,ω(L)-formula for
pairs of structures φ such that ‖ ‖T is uniquely determined by its ϕ-type over C
and that ϕ-type is not explicitly definable over C.
Remark 6.12 Note that even for discrete Lω1,ω this result is new.
In ongoing research, we extend this non-definability to even wider classes of
logics. Applications of Cp-theory to model theory are not confined to definability
questions. Stay tuned!
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8 Postscript
We have not meant to give the impression that extensions of [CI] constitute the
only applications of Cp-theory to model theory. In particular, at the suggestion
of the referee we shall say a few words about the work of P. Simon and K.
Khanaki.
The great utility of stability in model theory led to the investigation of less
stringent conditions, in particular what is now known as NIP (the failure of the
Independence Property). The “bible” for NIP is Simon’s book [34].
Definition 8.1 A formula ϕ(x, y) has the independence property in a model U if
there is an infinite subset A of the universe for which there is a family {bI : I ⊆
A} such that, for each a ∈ A, M |= ϕ(a, bI) ⇔ a ∈ I. The formula ϕ(x, y) is
NIP (or dependent) if it does not have the independence property.
As noted in [35] and elsewhere, this is equivalent to the condition that for any
model M of the theory, the closure in the type space of a subset of size at most
κ has cardinality at most 2κ. The reader will immediately be reminded of the
similar condition characterizing (model-theoretic) stability. Building on work of
Rosenthal [30], [31], Bourgain, Fremlin, and Talagrand [7] studied the closure in
RX for X Polish, of subsets A of Cp(X). As Simon notes, [7] proves that either
that closure A¯ contains non-measurable functions or every element of A¯ is a
pointwise limit of a sequence of elements of A, in which case |A¯| ≤ 2|A|. Simon
proves that this dichotomy explicitly corresponds to the dichotomy between
theories that do or do not satisfy the independence property.
The Baire class 1 functions are classically defined as the pointwise limits of
sequences of continuous real-valued functions. Compact subspaces of B1(X),
the collection of Baire class 1 functions for the topological space X , are called
Rosenthal compacta and have an extensive literature. We will not try to be
exhaustive in our references here. In addition to the already mentioned [7] and
[35], we call attention to the surveys of Negrepontis [28] and Debs [11] and the
deep work of Todorcevic [40]. Debs concentrates on separable Rosenthal com-
pacta; a noteworthy aspect of [35] is that by replacing sequential convergence
by filter convergence, Simon mainly eliminates what Aleksandrov [1] called the
“parasite of countability”. We say “mainly”, because the use of descriptive set
theory in [11] in the separable case cannot be replicated in the general case.
Moreover, it is in the case of countable theories and models that Simon [35]
establishes the connection between type spaces and Rosenthal compacta:
Theorem 8.2 (Proposition 2.16 of [35]) Let T and M be countable and ϕ(x, y)
NIP. Then Invϕ(M) is a Rosenthal compactum.
The relevant definitions are:
Definition 8.3 Given a model U and a submodel M with universe M , the set of
automorphisms of M fixing U is denoted by Aut(U/M). A ϕ-type p(x) over U is
M -ϕ-invariant if σp(x) = p(x) for every σ ∈ Aut(U/M). The set of all invariant
M -ϕ-types is denoted by Invϕ(M).
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The existence of a monster model is a model-theoretic technicality which
constitutes an important part of the literature and is relevant in this context.
In the previous definition, one is usually interested in U being the monster
model (a class-size model which embeds all set-size models) and M being a set-
size submodel. For a detailed introduction to the monster model, see [36] and
for more on invariant types see [34].
Strictly speaking, the study of Rosenthal compacta is not a part of Cp-theory,
since it involves Baire class 1 functions rather than continuous functions. How-
ever it is a natural extension of Cp-theory, and in his address at the conference
in the proceedings of which this paper will appear, the second author suggested
that topologists study B1(X) with the same vigour they have applied to Cp(X).
An interesting question is where do Rosenthal compacta appear in the spec-
trum of special compacta studied by Cp-theorists. Are they Eberlein, Gul’ko,
Corson, etc.? So far, the only positive result we have found in the literature is
that
Theorem 8.4 [11] Gul’ko compacta of weight ≤ 2ℵ0 are Rosenthal.
The deep analysis of [40] provides many negative results distinguishing Rosen-
thal compacta from the other well-known compacta studied by Cp-theorists. See
[11]. Mentioning properties of interest to those who study such compacta, we
have for example:
Theorem 8.5 [40] In every Rosenthal compactum, the set of Gδ-points includes
a dense metrizable subspace.
Theorem 8.6 [40] Rosenthal compacta have σ-disjoint π-bases.
Corollary 8.7 Rosenthal compacta satisfying the countable chain condition are
separable.
In a series of mainly unpublished papers, Karim Khanaki has explored con-
nections between model theory and Banach space theory. His latest, [25], covers
ground familiar to us, including stability, definability, Grothendieck, etc., as well
as topics we are just starting to research, such as NIP. However his work is con-
fined to first order logic (continuous or discrete), i.e. compact logics, and uses [7]
and classical analysis rather than Cp-theory. We expect to be able to generalize
many of his results to continuous Lω1,ω and beyond.
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